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1 Introduction
Working as a volunteer is a widespread social activity. Many people engage in it in
order to help correct perceived social problems. But volunteers also benefit personally and
economically from this kind of pro-social behaviour. The personal benefits include the “warm
glow” that one feels when giving to society. The economic benefits of volunteering derive
from the acquisition of human capital, an expanded network of contacts, and the signaling
of potentially productive characteristics to the labour market. Hence, working for free not
only brings a feeling of personal satisfaction, it may also have substantial investment value
that leads to higher wage oﬀers in paid work opportunities.
In this paper, we focus on measuring the investment value of volunteer work and oﬀer the
first instrumental variables (IV) estimates of the wage returns to unpaid work experience.
The data on volunteering decisions and annual earnings that we use are drawn from the
British Household Panel Study (BHPS) between the years 1996 and 2008. Information from
the BHPS is supplemented with data on rainfall in England, Scotland and Wales during the
same period. We construct an instrumental variable based on the rainfall data in order to
explicitly address the endogeneity problems involved and identify the wage returns.
Rainfall data is particularly appropriate in this context since it has recently been shown
to be a credible source of exogenous variation in the cost of participating in diﬀerent types
of outdoor activities. Examples include attendance at 4th of July celebrations, political
rallies and riots (Collins and Margo (2007), Madestam and Yanagizawa-Drott (2011) and
Madestam, Shoag, Veuger and Yanagizawa-Drott (2013)). Taking inspiration from these
studies, we conjecture that rainfall also induces exogenous variation in the cost of engag-
ing in volunteer work. Greater expected rainfall in a locality may lower the opportunity
cost of volunteering, as alternative outdoor leisure activities become less attractive. This
could increase the propensity to engage in unpaid work which mostly takes place indoors.
Greater anticipated rainfall should also have no direct eﬀect on earnings after controlling
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for unobserved individual fixed eﬀects and a detailed set of observables, including paid work
hours.
According to OLS estimates that do not seriously address the endogeneity problem, the
increase in mean annual earnings due to volunteer experience, in constant 1987 pounds ster-
ling, is a very modest £394 for men and a negligible -£29 for women. However, specifications
which make use of the longitudinal aspect of the data and include unobserved fixed eﬀects
yield higher and more precisely estimated returns of £1,372 for men and £649 for women.
IV estimates that exploit the rainfall instrument in addition to including fixed eﬀects pro-
duce still higher estimated annual returns of £4,859 for men and £3,096 for women. The IV
wage returns to volunteer experience are precisely estimated and substantial in magnitude as
sample average incomes are £11,725 and £7,007 for employed men and women, respectively.
It is interesting that in all of our specifications, the estimated returns to unpaid work
experience for men exceed those for women. A standard decomposition indicates that the
larger returns for men can account for up to 20.2% of the gender earnings gap. To put this
contribution to the gender earnings gap in perspective, we find that that it is smaller than
the (uncorrected) contribution of full-time paid work experience (25.3%) but greater than the
(uncorrected) contribution of part-time paid work experience (8.4%). The implication of the
decomposition exercise is that an unequal valuation of volunteer experience by gender may be
relatively more important in explaining the gender earnings gap than is the unequal valuation
of part-time paid work experience, and nearly as important as the unequal valuation of full-
time paid work experience.
In order to explore possible mechanisms underlying the substantial wage returns to vol-
unteer experience for both men and women, we also explore descriptive data from the UK
Citizenship Survey (UKCS). The UKCS does not reveal strong evidence in favor of a human
capital or networking explanation for the wage returns. For example, gaining a recognized
qualification or improving employment prospects is not stated to be a main motivation for
volunteering. Rather, volunteers appear to be seeking a sense of personal achievement, a
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feeling of being needed and enjoyment from doing things at which they excel. Thus, signaling
may be a more likely source of the returns if these latter personality characteristics are also
productive in the workplace and not immediately observable. Disconcertingly, the UKCS
data do not reveal obvious gender diﬀerences in sources of satisfaction, motivations, types
of volunteering organizations and activities that might help explain the diﬀerential returns
by gender.
The policy implications of the study are explored by formulating a simple model of
optimal volunteering and linking the theory to the empirical work. The model implies that
when there is negative selection, i.e., IV estimates exceed OLS estimates, a lower cost of
engaging in unpaid work would lead to an expanded and higher-skilled pool of volunteers,
and greater societal benefits from volunteer work. Thus, the model helps place the estimation
results in a broader policy context.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section formulates the model of
optimal volunteering. Section 3 describes the data, reports OLS and fixed eﬀects estimates,
and expands upon the rainfall instrument. Section 4 outlines the IV estimation strategy.
Section 5 reports reduced-form and IV estimates. Section 6 decomposes the gender earnings
gap, explores possible mechanisms underlying the wage returns, and the diﬀerential returns
by gender, and discusses the broader implications of negative selection. Section 7 summarizes
and concludes.
2 Model
The simple model of optimal volunteering is similar in spirit to the general model of
training in Heckman, LaLonde and Smith (1999). It diﬀers from a pure model of training
or certification by incorporating simultaneous paid and unpaid work, and non-pecuniary
benefits. The model helps interpret estimation results, establish identification, and place the
results in a broader policy context.
3
2.1 Decision Problem
Suppose there is a continuum of workers of skill type ⌘, where ⌘ is drawn from a distri-
bution F (·) with support ⇥⌘, ⌘⇤. ⌘ is conceived of as a general skill that is applicable to both
paid and unpaid work. Individuals live for two periods and have subjective discount rate r.
In the first period, individuals work for pay and choose whether to volunteer. In the second
period, individuals only work for pay.
Volunteer work in the first period generates non-pecuniary benefits referred to as warm
glow (see Andreoni (1989)). Let g1 (⌘) denote warm glow, where g1 (⌘) can either increase
or decrease with skill level. Volunteering in the first period also involves disutility of work
eﬀort and out-of-pocket costs. The disutility of work eﬀort is equivalent to foregone leisure.
The out-of-pocket costs include commuting and childcare expenses. These latter costs are
in addition to those incurred from having a paid job.
Let C1⌘ denote the monetary equivalent of additional foregone leisure and out-of-pocket
costs when choosing to volunteer. These costs decrease with skill level, reflecting the as-
sumption that higher-skilled individuals have diﬀerentially lower disutility of work eﬀort and
greater assets (less liquidity constrained).
Unpaid work may also have opportunity costs in terms of foregone earnings if it leads
to less hours being devoted to paid work. In contrast to the disutility of work eﬀort and
out-of-pocket costs, foregone earnings increase with skill level since wages increase with ⌘.
Note that less hours devoted to paid work also implies less disutility of work eﬀort, while
adding a volunteer job implies more. Hence, C1 should be interpreted as the net change in
the disutility of work eﬀort. It is the variation in the disutility of work eﬀort, out-of-pocket
costs and foregone earnings with skill level ⌘ that generates selection into volunteering.
Individuals seek to maximize lifetime income by choosing whether or not to volunteer in
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the first period. The value functions are
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where V k1 (⌘) , k = nv, v are the present discounted values of lifetime income in the non-
volunteering and volunteering options, respectively. wkt (⌘), k = nv, v, t = 1, 2, are the
corresponding earnings in each option and time period.1
Individuals choose to volunteer when V v1 (⌘) > V nv1 (⌘), or when
wv2 (⌘)  wnv2 (⌘)
(1 + r)
+ g1 (⌘) >
C1
⌘
+ (wnv1 (⌘)  wv1 (⌘)) . (3)
Equation (3) states that volunteering is optimal when the discounted wage returns to vol-
unteering plus warm glow exceed the costs of volunteering. The costs include the disutility
of work eﬀort, out-of-pocket expenses and foregone wages.
The decision rule can also be expressed in terms of the maximum C1 that an individual
of type ⌘ is willing to incur to volunteer. This is denoted by Cmax (⌘) and is found by solving
for the C1 that equates V v1 (⌘) and V nv1 (⌘), i.e.,
Cmax(⌘) = ⌘

wv2 (⌘)  wnv2 (⌘)
(1 + r)
  (wnv1 (⌘)  wv1(⌘)) + g1 (⌘)
 
. (4)
Individuals choose to volunteer when Cmax (⌘) > C1 and do not volunteer otherwise. For a
given ⌘, Cmax (⌘) decreases with a smaller discounted wage premium and a larger first period
wage loss. Cmax (⌘) increases with the extent of warm glow.
1Note that ⌘ might increase in period 2 to ⌘0 > ⌘ if there is skill acquisition in period 1. Modeling this
process and taking into account possible diﬀerential skill acquisition between paid and unpaid work would
not change anything of substance. This is also true for explicitly adding an unemployment option to the
model.
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2.2 Selection into Volunteering
If individuals who volunteer have lower intrinsic earnings potential (in the absence of
volunteering) than those who do not, then there is negative selection into volunteering.
Positive selection occurs when those with higher earnings potential individuals choose to
volunteer. The type of selection into volunteering can be determined by examining how
Cmax (⌘) varies with ⌘.
Diﬀerentiating equation (4) with respect to ⌘ yields
@Cmax (⌘)
@⌘
=
Cmax (⌘)
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+ ⌘
24 @(wv2 (⌘) wnv2 (⌘))@⌘
(1 + r)
  @ ((w
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+
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35 . (5)
As can be readily seen in equation (5), the sign of @Cmax(⌘)@⌘ is theoretically ambiguous. It
depends on how the discounted wage premium, the first period wage loss and warm glow vary
with skill level. If the signs and magnitudes of the derivatives on the right hand side are such
that @Cmax(⌘)@⌘ > 0, then higher-skilled individuals are willing to pay more to volunteer, and
there is positive selection into volunteering. In this case, individuals with ⌘ 2  ⌘, ⌘?  do not
volunteer and individuals with ⌘ 2 (⌘?, ⌘) volunteer. ⌘? is the point in the skill distribution
where Cmax (⌘) = C1. If @Cmax(⌘)@⌘ < 0, then higher-skilled individuals are willing to pay less
to volunteer, and there is negative selection into volunteering. In this latter case, individuals
with ⌘ 2  ⌘, ⌘?  volunteer and individuals with ⌘ 2 (⌘?, ⌘) do not volunteer.
The type of selection into volunteering has important implications for the eﬀects of policy
interventions. Consider a policy aimed at encouraging volunteer work, say through a tax
credit for childcare expenses incurred while volunteering. This corresponds in the model
to a decrease in C1. If there is positive selection into volunteering, a smaller C1 implies
Cmax (⌘) = C1 at a lower ⌘?. Hence, more low-skilled individuals choose to become volunteers.
An expanded pool of volunteers increases societal benefits but the average quality of the
volunteer pool, or the average quality of privately-provided social services, will be lower.
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Under negative selection, a decrease in C1 leads to Cmax (⌘) = C1 at a higher ⌘? and more
high-skilled individuals enter the pool of volunteers. This means there will be an expanded
pool of volunteers, a higher average quality of social services, and unambiguously greater
societal benefits. Hence, it is an important empirical matter to identify the type of selection
into volunteering.2
2.3 Identification
Identification of the wage returns to volunteer experience can be understood by estab-
lishing a link between the decision model and its implications for selection into volunteering,
and the population means estimated by OLS and IV. The decision model characterizes a vol-
unteer as having Cmax (⌘) > C1 and a wage wv2 (⌘), while a non-volunteer has Cmax (⌘)  C1
and a wage wnv2 (⌘). OLS yields a regression-adjusted estimate of
E (wv2 (⌘) | Cmax (⌘) > C1)  E (wnv2 (⌘) | Cmax (⌘)  C1) =
E (wv2 (⌘)  wnv2 (⌘) | Cmax (⌘) > C1) + (6)
(E (wnv2 (⌘) | Cmax (⌘) > C1)   E (wnv2 (⌘) | Cmax (⌘)  C1)).
The term to the left of the equals sign in equation (6) is the diﬀerence in mean wages
between volunteers and non-volunteers according to the model’s selection rule. The first term
after the equals sign is the mean return to volunteering amongst individuals who choose to
volunteer. It is the eﬀect of treatment on the treated. The second term is the diﬀerence in
mean non-volunteer wages between those who select into volunteering and those who do not.
This term is the selection bias. Clearly, OLS does not identify the causal eﬀect of volunteer
experience on mean wages.
2The model abstracts from any social costs of providing tax relief and focuses only on the social gains
derived from a greater number of volunteers and their productivity as captured by ⌘. For studies on the
relationship between taxation, government expenditures and charitable giving/volunteering, see Auten, Sieg
and Clotfelter (2002), Feldman (2010) and Bartels, Cozzi and Mantovan (2012).
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In contrast to OLS, IV yields a regression-adjusted estimate of the local average treatment
eﬀect (LATE), which is a causal expression (Angrist, Imbens and Rubin (1996)). In terms
of the model, LATE is
E
⇣
wv2 (⌘)  wnv2 (⌘) | C 001 > Cmax (⌘) > C 01
⌘
(7)
where C 001 and C
0
1 are exogenously high and low costs of volunteering, respectively. In the
empirical work, the rainfall instrument serves as the exogenous cost shifter.
Assuming that the rainfall instrument is valid, and LATE yields a good approximation
to the eﬀect of treatment on the treated, i.e.,
E
⇣
wv2 (⌘)  wnv2 (⌘) | C 001 > Cmax (⌘) > C 01
⌘
t E (wv2 (⌘)  wnv2 (⌘) | Cmax (⌘) > C1) , (8)
the diﬀerence between IV and OLS estimates is the selection bias. If IV exceeds OLS,
selection bias is negative, and according to the model, the least-skilled individuals choose
to volunteer. The opposite holds true if OLS exceeds IV. Selection bias is positive and
individuals who choose to volunteer are the highest-skilled.
3 Data
The individual level data are drawn from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS).
The BHPS began in 1991 with a representative sample of 5,500 households (10,300 individ-
uals) residing in 250 diﬀerent regions in England, Scotland and Wales. Each adult member
of the original sample (aged 16 and over) is interviewed face-to-face and re-interviewed an-
nually. Wave 1 sample members are followed into new households if they move out or their
original household breaks up. The BHPS ended with wave 18 in 2008.3
3The set of followed households was expanded in 1999 to include 1,500 additional households residing
in Wales and 1,500 additional households living in Scotland. Further expansion took place in 2001 with
the addition of 1,900 households residing in Northern Ireland. The BHPS was also augmented with 1,000
low-income households interviewed between 1997 and 2001 as part of the European Community Household
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In 1996, the BHPS began asking about voluntary activities, but only every two years.
This yields seven waves of information on unpaid work between 1996 and 2008. As a result of
additional sample restrictions, the estimation sample contains 4,995 men and 5,870 women,
corresponding to 12,811 man-years and 15,776 woman-years. The additional restrictions
are standard ones for the BHPS. We only consider respondents between the ages of 21
and 60. Retirees, the long-term sick and disabled, and individuals who did not reply to
the employment questions are excluded from the analysis. Men and women on paternity
or maternity leave are kept in the sample as long as they provide information on usual
employment status (part-time or full-time).
The exact wording of the volunteering question in the BHPS is, “We are interested in the
things people do in their leisure time. I’m going to read out a list of some leisure activities.
Please look at the card and tell me how frequently you do each one...unpaid voluntary work.”
The options on the card are, i) at least once a week, ii) at least once a month, iii) several
times a year, iv) once a year or less and v) never/almost never.
In the regression analysis, a dummy variable is set equal to one if the individual reports
having done any unpaid voluntary work in the current survey or any past survey, and zero
otherwise. Day and Devlin (1997,1998) define their volunteering dummy analogously in their
cross-sectional Canadian data. This proxy for accumulated volunteer experience allows past
volunteering to aﬀect future earnings as in the theoretical model. We do not distinguish the
number of years (greater than one) that an individual volunteers over the sample period.
Assigning an exact value for accumulated years of volunteer experience is impossible due to
unobserved initial conditions and missing data during the sample period. Missing data during
the sample period derives from temporary attrition as well as the fact that the volunteering
questions are asked every two years.
Panel. Because there is relatively little information available on the volunteering outcomes of residents of
Northern Ireland, they are eliminated from the sample.
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3.1 Descriptive Statistics
Table (1) reports information on the frequency of unpaid work by year and gender in the
current wave only (ignoring voluntary activities further in the past). Pooled over all years,
the mean volunteering rate is 18.7% for men and 21.1% for women. Amongst the volunteers,
women engage in unpaid work more frequently than men. Between the years 1996 and 2008,
the yearly volunteering rate fluctuates in a fairly tight range, except for a noticeable jump
amongst both genders in the 2002 wave. The jump is fully reflected in the increase in the
volunteer “once a year or less” category. In the regression analysis, year controls capture this
anomaly.
The diﬀerences in the characteristics of volunteers and non-volunteers by gender is shown
in Table (2). The figures illustrate that both male and female volunteers are more educated,
more likely to be employed in a paid job, have higher earnings and spousal income, are slightly
older, more likely to be married and have older children than non-volunteers of the same
gender. Male volunteers are more likely to be employed in full-time paid work while female
volunteers are more likely to be employed in part-time paid work compared to non-volunteers
of the same gender. Diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences estimates by characteristic show significant
gender diﬀerentials between volunteers and non-volunteers in full-time paid employment,
earnings and spousal income. These patterns are highly consistent with previous findings
in the volunteer labor supply literature (see Menchik and Weisbrod (1987) and Freeman
(1997)).
The distribution of accumulated volunteer experience by gender is displayed in the bottom
panel of Table (2). The accumulation is highly inaccurate for the reasons mentioned earlier.
Nonetheless, it is useful for purely descriptive purposes and establishing bounds. The figures
show that 59.9% of men never volunteered, compared to 55.4% of women. These are clearly
upper bound figures due to the initial conditions and missing data problems. Amongst those
who are observed to volunteer at least one year, 72.5% of men volunteered at least one or
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two years. The corresponding figure for women is 66.2%. Thus, there is no strong reason
to believe that one particular gender is relatively more persistent in volunteering behavior.
This implies that the definition of the volunteering dummy used in the regression analysis
should not be problematic for inferring gender diﬀerences.
3.2 OLS and Fixed Eﬀects Estimates
OLS and fixed eﬀects estimates of the increase in mean annual earnings due to vol-
unteer experience are reported in Table (3). In the OLS regressions, standard errors are
heteroskedasticity-robust, and in the fixed eﬀects regressions, standard errors are clustered
at the individual level. This yields the largest standard errors amongst the various alter-
natives and is therefore the most conservative strategy from the viewpoint of statistical
significance. In order to reduce selection bias in a relatively innocuous way, we do not select
the sample based on employment status and include zero earnings in the regressions for those
without paid employment. Further, we take a more non-parametric approach than usual by
eschewing log-linear specifications. That is, we focus on income levels rather than logs and
calculate percentage impacts of the covariate of interest (See Kugler and Sauer (2005)).
With year and region dummies included, OLS yields an estimated increase in annual
earnings of £1,698 for men (column (1)). For the purpose of translating this level increase
into percentage terms, we use a “treatment on the treated” percentage impact figure. The
percentage impact is defined as the ratio of the coeﬃcient on volunteering to predicted
earnings. Predicted earnings is the fitted value of earnings amongst individuals that have
volunteer experience (the treated) with the volunteering dummy counterfactually set to zero.
The resulting percentage impact corresponding to £1,698 is 15.7%.
Column (2) includes employment, education and ethnicity variables as well as other
covariates, such as the number of children, whether the individual is a student, spousal
income, dummies for age, marital status, age of children, belonging to a union, being a
professional/manager, working for a nonprofit organization, the size of the firm, and having
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use of a car. Adding these covariates reduces the estimated return to £394. The percentage
impact is 2.4%.
Column (3) reports fixed eﬀects estimates for men without any time-varying controls.
The estimated return is £1,537, corresponding to a percentage impact of 14.9%. Adding
paid employment indicators and other time-varying regressors to the fixed eﬀects regression
yields a return of £1,372, or a percentage impact of 12.1% (column (4)). The returns to
volunteer experience in these specifications are precisely estimated.
The estimated returns for women, reported in columns (5) through (8), are consistently
lower than those obtained for men. With year and region dummies, OLS yields an estimated
return of £320, or a percentage impact of 5.8%. Adding other regressors, the return decreases
to -£29 and loses statistical significance. The percentage impact is -3.7%.
Including individual fixed eﬀects, the estimated returns for women become larger in
magnitude and precisely estimated. Without any time-varying controls, the estimated return
is £646, corresponding to a percentage impact of 12.4%. Adding controls, the estimated
return increases slightly to £649, implying a percentage impact of 14.1%. The results also
indicate that the paid employment variables are particularly important covariates for both
men and women. The age of children dummies (not shown in the table) have a strong impact
on the earnings of women but not men.
3.3 The Rainfall Instrument
Rainfall data have been used before, quite extensively, in studies of economic growth
and conflict. Miguel, Satyanath and Sergenti (2004) examine a cross-section of 41 African
countries and find that economic growth is a negative predictor of conflicts, using rainfall
as instrument. Bruckner and Ciccone (2011) use rainfall as an instrument to show that
transitory economic shocks can trigger democratic transitions in Sub-Saharan countries (see
also Paxson (1992), Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1993) and Maccini and Yang (2009)). The
validity of the rainfall instrument in this context has not gone unquestioned. For example,
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Sarsons (2015) finds a strong eﬀect of rainfall on conflicts in Indian districts that are irrigated
through dams, suggesting that income is not the only channel through which rainfall is
aﬀecting conflict.
Rainfall has only recently been used as an instrument for participation in outdoor activ-
ities such as 4th of July celebrations, political rallies and riots. Collins and Margo (2007)
use rainfall as in instrument for rioting in the US. They find that an increase in rainfall
decreased the propensity for riots to occur in the 1960s, which in turn aﬀected the value
of houses in African-American neighbourhoods. Similarly, Madestam Shoag, Veuger and
Yanagizawa-Drott (2013) use rainfall as instrument for attendance at Tea Party rallies in
order to evaluate the success of the political movement. Madestam and Yanagizawa-Drott
(2011) use rainfall as an instrument for childhood attendance at 4th of July celebrations to
explain political preferences. There are no studies yet which have seriously questioned the
validity of the rainfall instrument in this alternative context.
In the spirit of these latter studies, we conjecture that rainfall also induces exogenous
variation in the cost of volunteering. Greater expected rainfall is likely to lower the opportu-
nity cost of volunteering, as alternative outdoor leisure activities become less attractive. This
should increase the propensity to engage in unpaid work. However, more rainfall should have
no direct eﬀect on earnings after controlling for a detailed set of observables and individual
fixed eﬀects.
There is indeed evidence that volunteering in the UK is mainly an indoor activity. From
the volunteering websites do-it.org.uk and volunteering.co.uk, one can readily examine the
range of volunteer job openings. While a few volunteer posts do involve outdoor work, for
example serving as a summer camp counselor, the overwhelming majority of posts are asso-
ciated with indoor work. Obvious examples include volunteering opportunities in museums
and libraries.
In order to illustrate that there is suﬃcient variation in the proposed instrument, Figure
(1), obtained from the Met Oﬃce website, displays average yearly rainfall levels across the
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UK. In the south, the southeast (including London) and East Anglia, less than 700 millime-
ters of rain usually fall per year. In Essex, rainfall can be below 450 millimeters annually,
which is less than the average annual rainfall in Jerusalem and Beirut. The mountains of
Wales, Scotland, the Pennines and the moors of southwest England are the wettest parts of
the UK. As much as 4,500 millimeters of rain can fall annually in these areas, making them
some of the wettest locations in all of Europe.
The Met Oﬃce releases its rainfall data via the Met Oﬃce Integrated Data Archive Sys-
tem (MIDAS), accessed through the British Atmospheric Data Centre. For the years covering
our sample period, we obtained daily rainfall information from every available weather sta-
tion in England, Scotland and Wales that operated during the entire year. Measurements
were obtained from a yearly average of 2,027 weather stations.
The BHPS contains information on the Local Authority District (LAD) in which a respon-
dent lives. Using GeoConvert, a service available from the UK Data Service, it is possible
to match LADs to postcode districts. Weather stations can also be linked to a postcode
district. After merging the BHPS and the MIDAS datasets, we obtained 50,419 person-year
observations distributed across 364 diﬀerent LADs.
The rainfall instrument for each individual is then defined as a three-year moving average
of mean daily rainfall (previous, current and following year) in the person’s LAD of residence.
The three-year moving average has both theoretical and practical appeal. On the theoretical
level it allows for adaptive expectations that are also forward looking. Use of a yearly moving
average also recognizes that volunteer work is a time commitment that is likely to be based
on longer-term weather trends rather than very short-term weather shocks. On the practical
side, it smooths the rainfall data while still producing substantial variation in the instrument
over time.
Table (4) reports the mean three-year moving average, by year, in eight large regions in
the UK. There is clearly quite a bit of cross-sectional and time variation in the instrument.
The mean daily rainfall (in millimeters) in 1996 is considerably lower than in 2008 across all
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regions. The amount of rainfall fluctuates from year to year but does tend to grow over time.
Pooling over all years, it is evident that Wales and North England are the wettest regions,
while East England and London are the driest. The table also shows the number of LADs
in the data, in each one of the major regions.
As will be shown in the first-stage regressions of the IV procedure, there is a strong
positive correlation between regional rainfall and the propensity to volunteer in wetter areas.
The main threat to identification when using rainfall as an instrument rests in the possibility
that rainfall may also directly aﬀect earnings through the choice to work more hours in a
paid job. This threat is reduced by including flexible controls for hours of paid work in all
our specifications. Importantly, an alternative first stage regression that uses hours of paid
work per week as the dependent variable also indicates no correlation between hours of paid
work and rainfall. The results of several placebo first-stage regressions are reported below.
4 Estimation Strategy
The estimation framework that we consider is a linear, constant-eﬀects model that con-
nects the annual earnings of individual i at time t, Yit, with a proxy for volunteer experience,
Vit, a vector of individual characteristics, Xit, an individual time-invariant eﬀect, ui, and a
random error component specific to individuals at time t, ✏it:
Yit = Xit  + Vit,↵ + ui + ✏it (9)
Equation (9) describes the earnings of individuals under alternative assignments of volun-
teer experience, controlling for any eﬀects ofXit and ui. Xit contains a large set of observables
described earlier. ui captures unobserved time-invariant skill and preference characteristics
while ✏it represents unobserved time-varying skill and preference shocks.
As equation (4) in the decision model makes explicit, Vit is not randomly assigned. Vit
is likely to be correlated with ✏it, even after controlling for Xit and ui, due to time-varying
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shocks to ⌘, or warm glow g1(⌘). Therefore, OLS and fixed-eﬀects estimates of equation (9)
do not have a causal interpretation.
In IV estimation, the first-stage relationship between volunteer experience, Xit, ui and
the rainfall instrument, Wit, is
Vit = Xit⇡0 +W it⇡1 + ui + ⇠it. (10)
The error term ⇠it is defined as the residual from the population regression of Vit on Xit,
ui and the instrument Wit. This residual captures other factors that are correlated with
volunteer experience and may be correlated with ✏it, such as unobserved skill and warm glow
preference shocks.
As mentioned earlier, the key identifying assumption is that rainfall aﬀects the cost
of volunteering but does not directly influence earnings, after controlling for Xit and ui.
IV estimates have a causal interpretation as long as the association between rainfall and
earnings is solely due to the association between rainfall and the decision to volunteer. As
in the OLS and fixed eﬀects estimates, Xit contains the reported number of hours of paid
work as well as dummies for part-time and full-time paid employment. This reduces the
threat to identification deriving from rainfall having a direct eﬀect on earnings through more
hours being worked in a paid job. It is also important to reiterate that alternative first stage
regressions that use hours of paid work per week as the dependent variable do not reveal any
correlation between hours of paid work and rainfall. In addition, inclusion of the individual
fixed eﬀect ui corrects for the possibility that highly-skilled individuals may sort to dryer
locations.
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5 Estimation Results
5.1 Reduced-Form Estimates
Reduced-form estimates of the eﬀect of rainfall are reported in Table (5). Standard errors
are clustered at the individual level. Clustering at the individual level produces the largest
standard errors amongst the various alternatives and is therefore the most conservative
strategy. The fixed eﬀects regressions in columns (1)-(4) include a relatively large set of time-
varying covariates. In addition to several controls for hours of paid work that are shown in the
table, other regressors include the number of children, whether the individual is a student,
spousal income, dummies for age, marital status, age of children, union membership, being
a professional/manager, working for a non profit organization, firm size, and having use of
a car.
Columns (1) and (3) show coeﬃcients for the first stage described in equation (10).
Estimates of fixed eﬀects linear probability models reveal that a higher three-year moving
average of rainfall increases the probability of having volunteer experience amongst both men
and women. This is consistent with the conjecture that rainfall decreases the opportunity cost
of volunteering. The relationship between rainfall and the propensity to volunteer is stronger
for women than for men but the respective coeﬃcients (.047 and .056) are not significantly
diﬀerent. The F-statistics at the bottom of the table indicate that the instrument is quite
strong for both genders. An additional test for weak instruments is performed below.
Columns (2) and (4) report reduced-form eﬀects of the rainfall instrument on mean
annual earnings. More rainfall is associated with higher mean earnings. The relationship is
relatively stronger for men than women. The eﬀect of rainfall on mean annual earnings is
precisely estimated for both genders.
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5.2 Instrumental Variables Estimates
IV estimates of the eﬀect of volunteer experience on mean annual earnings are reported
in Table (6). Volunteer experience is instrumented with the three-year moving average of
rainfall. Fixed eﬀects are included as are the same set of time-varying controls described
earlier in the context of the reduced form estimates.
The IV estimate of the returns to volunteer experience for men is £4,859 (column (1)).
The eﬀect is precisely estimated and implies a percentage impact of 45.5%. This is in
contrast to the annual increase of £1,372, or percentage impact of 12.1%, produced by the
corresponding fixed eﬀects specification without the rainfall instrument (Table (3)).
The IV estimate of the returns to volunteer experience for women is £3,096 (column
(2)). The eﬀect is also precisely estimated and implies a percentage impact of 38.3%. This
contrasts with the annual increase of £649, or percentage impact of 14.1%, produced by the
corresponding fixed eﬀects specification in Table (3). Even though the returns to volunteer
experience are now more substantial in magnitude for women, they are still smaller than for
men.
It is important to note that the returns to volunteer experience that we estimate are
the returns among individuals who would not have volunteered had the expected long-term
weather outlook been diﬀerent. That is, they are local average treatment eﬀects. Individuals
who are the most sensitive to rainfall (the cost of volunteering) contribute the most to the
average causal response (see Angrist, Graddy and Imbens (2000)). We attempted to say a
bit more about who these compliers are by calculating the likelihood of being a complier for
each individual characteristic in isolation. We found that compliers are not likely to have
children, perhaps because parents are often required to do a certain amount of volunteering
for their children’s school. Being male and working part-time is strongly indicative of being
a complier, although this represents a very small proportion of the sample. We did not find
any other individual characteristics that are strong indicators of being a complier.
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We believe the relatively large “treatment on the treated” percentage impacts produced
are plausible. The additional monetary costs incurred when an individual volunteers, e.g.,
additional childcare expenses, can be considerable. These latter annual costs are generally
within the range of the increase in annual earnings that the IV estimates produce. High
marginal costs require suﬃciently large returns in future paid work to make volunteer work
economically viable.
Because we are identifying local average treatment eﬀects, our estimates are also not
directly comparable to the very few already existing estimates. Day and Devlin (1997,1998)
obtain returns to volunteer experience in Canada of 6.6%. By gender, the returns are 9%
for men and zero for women. These estimates are not corrected for biases due to nonrandom
selection. However, they are roughly similar to our pooled OLS estimates.
Sauer (2012) estimates returns to volunteer experience for women in the US that amount
to 8.2% in part-time work and 2.4% in full-time work. These latter estimates are corrected for
nonrandom selection, but are derived from a discrete choice dynamic programming model
and correspond to average treatment eﬀects. Although these estimates are not directly
comparable, there is now increasing evidence that the returns to volunteer experience are
economically important.
5.3 Robustness Checks
Table (7) reports several robustness checks and additional IV results of interest. The
2SLS estimates of the returns to volunteer experience are reproduced from Table (6) in
order to facilitate comparison. Below the 2SLS estimates, limited information maximum
likelihood (LIML) estimates of the returns are reported. The 2SLS and LIML estimates
are nearly identical. This further suggests that there is little worry of a weak instruments
problem.
The table also reports IV estimates of the returns to volunteer experience produced when
only individuals with greater than zero annual earnings are included. The returns increase
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from £4,859 to £5,503 for men, and from £3,096 to £4,106 for women. The returns are
precisely estimated. Ignoring selection bias thus leads to higher estimated returns. In this
case, including the unemployed and assigning zero earnings not only addresses selection bias
it is also a more conservative empirical strategy.
An additional robustness check excludes individuals that reside in London. The returns
to volunteer experience decrease only slightly to £4,560 and £3,061 for men and women,
respectively. The returns are precisely estimated even though there is a relatively large loss
in sample size. Using mean daily rainfall in the year of the individual’s current residence
as the instrument instead of the three year moving average., the returns increase to £6,010
and £3,704 for men and women, respectively. The standard errors in this latter specification
increase but the returns are still precisely estimated. Using the three-year moving average
and smoothing out the rainfall data produces more conservative and less noisy estimates of
the returns to volunteer experience. The final row of Table (7) reports estimates when a
three-year moving average of temperature is used in place of the three-year moving average of
rainfall. The IV estimates are even more substantial in magnitude and precisely estimated.
However, the sample size is considerably reduced and the instrument is relatively weaker.
Using data on sunshine in an analogous way reduces the sample size further and produces
much noisier estimates (not shown).
There are additional IV results worth mentioning, but not shown for sake of brevity.
Most important, there are no significant interactions between volunteer experience and other
covariates for both men and women. Thus, there is little suspicion of heterogeneous treatment
eﬀects. Using an alternative definition of volunteer experience, which relies on reported
volunteering only two years earlier, the length of time between questions in the survey,
produces very imprecise estimates. As argued earlier, this latter definition is expected to
produce a very noisy measure of volunteer experience. We also introduced time fixed eﬀects,
however they were diﬃcult to identify individually. We were able to find a significant decade
eﬀect by introducing two year dummies, one for one for the years 2002 and 2004, and one for
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the years 2006 and 2008. The base category contains years 1996, 1998, and 2000. Introducing
these time fixed eﬀects does not substantially change the results.4
In order to further explore the validity of the rainfall instrument, Table (8) presents the
results of alternative, placebo-type first-stage regressions. The idea is that if rainfall were
strongly correlated with several other important outcomes, besides volunteer experience,
then volunteering would possibly not be the main channel through which rainfall is aﬀecting
income. Exogeneity of the rainfall instrument would then be more questionable. Using hours
worked, full-time work status, marital status, spousal income and the number of children
as alternative dependent variables, Table (8) clearly illustrates that none of the placebo
first-stage regressions reveal any substantial or statistically significant eﬀects of rainfall.
6 Discussion
6.1 The Gender Earnings Gap
In order to assess the extent to which gender diﬀerences in the returns to volunteer
experience contribute to the gender earnings gap, we follow Day and Devlin (1997) and
compute a standard Blinder (1973) and Oaxaca (1973) earnings decomposition. Although
alternative decomposition methods have recently been explored (e.g., Card, Cardoso, and
Kline (2013)), other methods are either not appropriate in our context or do not readily
extend to a detailed decomposition into individual components. The standard decomposition
is,
Y
m   Y f = b m ⇣Xm  Xf⌘+ ⇣b m   b f⌘Xf (11)
where Y j is mean earnings, b j is a row vector of IV estimates, and Xj is a column vector of
sample means, for j = m, f (males and females, respectively).
The first term after the equals sign in (11), referred to as the endowments eﬀect, is the
4For men, the IV coeﬃcient on volunteering with time fixed eﬀects is 4.44, with a standard error of 2.2.
For women, the corresponding IV coeﬃcient is 3.89, with a standard error of 1.33.
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part of the gender earnings gap attributable to diﬀerences in characteristics. The second term
after the equals sign, referred to as the coeﬃcients eﬀect, is the part of the gap attributable
to diﬀerences in the returns to those characteristics.
Table (9) reports the resulting endowment and coeﬃcients eﬀects for volunteer, part-time
and full-time experience, as well as the percentage of the earnings gap due to the coeﬃcients
eﬀect, using the IV estimates. The decomposition shows that 72.2% of the mean earnings
gap of £3,624 is attributable to the coeﬃcients eﬀect. This is consistent with the wider
literature on gender diﬀerences which suggests that diﬀerences in skill levels have become
increasingly less important (see, e.g., Niederle and Vesterlund (2007)). It is also consistent
with previous studies on the gender earnings gap in the UK. In particular, Wright and
Ermish (1991) estimate that 48.8% of the gender earnings gap in the UK, in 1980, is due
to the coeﬃcients eﬀect. Considering that skill diﬀerences have become less important over
time, the coeﬃcients eﬀect should now be larger, as we indeed find.
Most important, the decomposition indicates that the diﬀerential returns to volunteer
experience account for 20.2% of the total earnings gap. Interestingly, this lies between the
corresponding contributions of part-time and full-time paid work experience. The diﬀerential
returns to part-time and full-time experience account for 8.4% and 25.3% of the total earnings
gap, respectively. The implication is that a more equal valuation of volunteer experience is
relatively more important in closing the gender earnings gap than is a more equal valuation
of part-time paid work experience. The unequal valuation of volunteer experience by gender
is nearly as important as the unequal valuation of full-time paid work experience. A caveat
to this conclusion is that the contributions of part-time and full-time experience are not
corrected for non-random selection. It is possible that the ranking between the diﬀerent
returns to experience would be altered were good instruments available for part-time and full-
time experience as well. Nonetheless, we believe the uncorrected ranking provides important
information that has not yet been supplied in the literature.5
5The results in Table (9) are robust to changes in the base category for the categorical variables and to
using the female earnings structure, rather than the male’s, as the counterfactual (see Fortin, Lemieux and
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6.2 Mechanisms
The decomposition results illustrate the importance of the diﬀerential returns to volunteer
experience in explaining the gender earnings gap. However, they do not shed much light on
why women receive lower returns to volunteer experience than men. In order to explore
sources of the returns to volunteer experience, and possible reasons for gender diﬀerentials,
we examine data from the UK Citizenship Survey (UKCS).
The UKCS ran every two years from 2001 until 2007. It was subsequently conducted on
a quarterly basis until its cancellation in 2011. In each wave, approximately 15,000 adults
living in England and Wales were interviewed. The UKCS contains more comprehensive
questions on volunteering than the BHPS, but is purely cross-sectional and the volunteering
questions tend to vary substantially each wave. However, it is quite useful for descriptive
purposes. The UKCS sample we use closely mimics the BHPS sample. The total number of
observations is 58,062.
In general, the UKCS does not reveal strong evidence in favor of a human capital or
networking explanation underlying the wage returns to volunteer experience. Rather, vol-
unteers appear to be seeking a sense of personal achievement, a feeling of being needed and
enjoyment from doing things at which they excel. Thus, signaling may be a more likely
source of the returns if these latter personality characteristics are also productive in the
workplace and not immediately observable. The UKCS also does not reveal obvious gender
diﬀerences that might help explain the diﬀerential returns by gender. This is illustrated in
Tables (10) - (12).
Table (10) reports the types of organizations for which people volunteer. The most
frequent organizations are those involved in education, sports, religion, the arts and social
activities. A substantial proportion also choose the “other/none of these” category. Women
engage more in educational activities, while men are more involved in sports related activities.
However, gender diﬀerences are not quantitatively strong.
Firpo (2011)).
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The top panel of Table (11) displays information on the types of formal volunteering ac-
tivities in which individuals engage. The most common activities are fundraising, organizing
activities, giving advice or counseling and other practical help. The most frequent choice is
“none of the above”. Women are involved somewhat more in other practical help, while men
provide more transportation services. However, this latter activity is not a frequent one.
Strong gender diﬀerences are not apparent in this dimension either.
The middle panel of the table shows the distribution of informal volunteering activities.
The most common categories are giving advice, looking after property, caring for children,
and helping those who have diﬃculty shopping, paying bills, writing letters and getting out
and about. Women do more shopping and paying bills and men engage more in home or car
repairs. However, this latter category is not a frequent one. Gender diﬀerences are negligible.
The bottom panel of the table shows that informal volunteering is more frequent than formal
volunteering. But there are no substantial gender diﬀerences.
The top panel of Table (12) lists a set of volunteering motivations. The most common
categories are wanting to help people and the cause being important. Among the least
common categories are getting on in one’s career and having a chance to acquire a recognized
qualification. Men are slightly more motivated if friends or family volunteered in the past,
while women care more if the volunteering activity is connected with the needs of family or
friends. Gender diﬀerences in motivations are small in magnitude.
The bottom panel of the table lists various types of satisfaction derived from volunteering.
The frequencies indicate that gaining a recognized qualification or improving employment
prospects is not a main motivation. Volunteers are more satisfied by meeting people, making
friends, seeing results, having a sense of personal achievement and enjoying themselves.
Women gain more satisfaction if they meet people, make friends and feel needed, while men
are more interested in having a chance to do things at which they excel. Gender diﬀerences
are once again small in magnitude.
In sum, the UKCS does not reveal substantial gender diﬀerences along several diﬀerent
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dimensions of volunteer experience. Volunteering as a means of acquiring human capital or
expanding networks also does not figure prominently in the responses of volunteers. Volun-
teers appear to be individuals with social concerns that are motivated to help people and
help correct perceived social problems. These may also be productive characteristics that are
attractive to employers. If so, one may conclude that the most likely source of the returns to
volunteer experience for both men and women is signaling. Disconcertingly, the signal may
be less eﬀective for women than for men.6
6.3 Negative Selection
The results in Tables (3) and (6) show that IV estimates of the returns to volunteer
experience are consistently larger than in corresponding specifications estimated by OLS.
This indicates negative selection into volunteering amongst both men and women. In other
words, individuals who volunteer have lower intrinsic earnings potential (in the absence of
volunteering) than those who do not.
The theoretical model of optimal volunteering presented earlier characterizes negative
selection as a state in which those with intrinsic earnings potential ⌘ 2  ⌘, ⌘?  volunteer and
those with ⌘ 2 (⌘?, ⌘) do not. Under negative selection, @Cmax(⌘)@⌘ < 0, or the maximum an
individual is willing to pay to volunteer decreases with skill level. As equation (5) clearly
illustrates, the sign of @Cmax(⌘)@⌘ depends on how the discounted wage premium, the monetary
costs and warm-glow from volunteering vary with ⌘. Since we find no empirical evidence
of heterogeneous discounted wage premia, @Cmax(⌘)@⌘ < 0 may be due to the wage loss from
volunteering increasing with ⌘, or warm glow decreasing with ⌘, or a combination of the two.
Within the context of the theoretical model, negative selection also has important im-
plications for the predicted eﬀects of policy interventions. This is especially relevant in the
6As mentioned earlier, we did not find substantial interactions with volunteer experience besides gender.
In particular, low education and high education individuals receive approximately the same returns to vol-
unteering. Thus, there is no evidence that the volunteering signal is either substitutable or complementary
with the education signal.
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UK, where successive governments have been searching for ways to promote voluntary activ-
ities as part of a “Big Society” initiative. Consider a policy aimed at encouraging voluntary
activity via a tax credit for childcare expenses incurred while volunteering. This translates
into a decrease in C1, which leads to Cmax (⌘) = C1 at a higher ⌘?. This implies that more
highly-skilled individuals would enter the pool of volunteers. Thus, in addition to the ex-
panded pool of volunteers, there would also be a higher average quality of social services
flowing from increased voluntary activities.
It is interesting to note that a childcare tax credit might also lead to a narrowing of
the gender earnings gap. This could occur if the tax credit had the eﬀect of reducing C1
relatively more for women than for men. The increase in ⌘? would then be relatively greater
for women, resulting in a composition eﬀect that increased mean annual earnings for women
by more than it increased mean annual earnings for men.
7 Conclusion
This study measures the future wage returns to volunteer experience. OLS estimates of the
increase in mean annual earnings due to volunteer experience are £394 for men and -£29 for
women. Fixed eﬀects estimates yield higher estimated returns of £1,372 for men and £649
for women. IV estimates that include fixed eﬀects and instrument volunteer experience with
a three-year moving average of district level mean daily rainfall produce more substantial and
precisely estimated returns of £4,895 and £3,096 for men and women, respectively. These
latter estimates are local average treatment eﬀects and should be interpreted as the returns
amongst individuals who would not have volunteered had the weather been diﬀerent.
In nearly all of our specifications men enjoy larger returns to volunteer experience than
women. We show that the diﬀerentially larger returns for men account for up to 20.2% of the
gender earnings gap. This lies between the contributions of the diﬀerential returns to part-
time and full-time paid work experience (8.4% and 25.3%, respectively). The implication is
that a more equal valuation of volunteer experience is relatively more important in closing the
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gender earnings gap than is a more equal valuation of part-time paid work experience. The
unequal valuation of volunteer experience by gender is nearly as important as the unequal
valuation of full-time paid work experience in explaining the gender earnings gap.
Analysis of an additional data set, the UK Citizenship Survey, suggests that the most
likely source of the returns to volunteer experience for both men and women is signaling.
Volunteers appear to be individuals with social concerns that are motivated to help people
and help correct perceived social problems. These may also be productive characteristics
that are attractive to employers. The UKCS does not contain strong descriptive evidence
of substantial diﬀerences in the types of volunteer organizations, activities, motivations or
sources of satisfaction between genders that might explain the diﬀerential returns.
IV estimates that exceed OLS estimates of the returns to volunteer experience suggest
that there is negative selection into volunteering for both genders. In order to give an
economic interpretation to the OLS and IV estimates, we develop a simple model of optimal
volunteering. According to the model, the negative selection that we empirically find implies
that a reduction in the cost of volunteering would lead to an expanded and higher-skilled pool
of volunteers, and greater societal benefits. Moreover, a reduction in the cost of volunteering
could also help narrow the gender earnings gap.
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Figure 1: Average Annual Rainfall in the UK 1981-2010
C:/Users/Noemi/Documents/women_volunteering/Rainfall_Average_1981-2010_17-1.pdf
31
Table 1: Volunteering by Year and Gender
Never/ Once a year Several times At least once At least once
Year Almost Never or less a year a month a week N
1996 .804 .047 .0488 .038 .063 4,036
Men .823 .047 .047 .032 .051 1,814
Women .788 .047 .049 .043 .073 2,222
1998 .826 .043 .046 .034 .052 4,434
Men .846 .038 .045 .033 .038 1,952
Women .809 .046 .046 .035 .063 2,482
2000 .831 .035 .045 .036 .053 5,859
Men .848 .036 .042 .031 .042 2,590
Women .817 .035 .047 .040 .062 3,269
2002 .699 .163 .049 .034 .055 4,906
Men .690 .181 .047 .034 .048 2,178
Women .706 .148 .050 .035 .061 2,728
2004 .829 .049 .042 .031 .049 4,745
Men .837 .054 .043 .026 .039 2,097
Women .822 .045 .041 .035 .057 2,648
2006 .817 .045 .052 .031 .055 3,376
Men .833 .048 .050 .029 .041 1,487
Women .805 .042 .054 .033 .066 1,889
2008 .794 .049 .065 .058 .035 3,660
Men .822 .048 .055 .048 .028 1,633
Women .771 .049 .073 .066 .040 1,027
Pooled .800 .063 .049 .037 .052 31,016
Men .813 .066 .047 .033 .041 13,751
Women .789 .060 .050 .040 .060 17,265
Note: The figures are row proportions. N is the number of male and female respondents aged 21-60 that answered the
volunteering question in the corresponding year that it was asked.
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Table 2: Characteristics of Volunteers and Non-Volunteers by Gender
Men Women
Full Non- Diﬀ Full Non- Diﬀ Diﬀ-in-Diﬀ
Sample Vol Vol (2) - (3) Sample Vol Vol (6) - (7) (8) - (4)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Age 37.346(.160) 38.341 36.823 1.518(.336) 37.625(.147) 38.502 37.087 1.416(.303) -.102(.453)
Married .492(.007) .560 .456 .104(.014) .496(.006) .556 .459 .098(.013) -.006(.019)
Children .618(.013) .660 .595 .065(.027) .742(.013) .810 .700 .110(.026) .045(.038)
Young 0-4 .147(.004) .138 .152 -.014(.009) .166(.004) .169 .165 .005(.008) .018(.012)
Young 5-11 .147(.004) .174 .133 .041(.009) .181(.004) .204 .167 .037(.008) -.005(.012)
Young 12-18 .091(.003) .099 .087 .013(.007) .108(.003) .127 .097 .030(.006) .017(.009)
Employed .901(.004) .928 .887 .041(.009) .916(.004) .925 .910 .015(.007) -.025(.011)
Part-time .036(.002) .046 .032 .014(.005) .227(.005) .248 .214 .033(.009) .020(.011)
Full-time .776(.005) .793 .766 .027(.011) .455(.006) .428 .471 -.043(.012) -.070(.017)
Hours 31.030(.209) 31.503 30.781 .721(.440) 20.515(.195) 19.726 20.999 -1.273(.402) -1.994(.596)
Earnings 9.783(.090) 11.245 9.016 2.230(.186) 5.112(.061) 5.500 4.874 .627(.125) -1.603(.218)
Spouse Inc. 2.689(.061) 3.380 2.326 1.053(.127) 5.769(.108) 7.361 4.793 2.569(.220) 1.515(.268)
Lower Edu .063(.003) .038 .076 -.038(.007) .071(.003) .051 .083 -.031(.007) .007(.010)
High School .311(.007) .262 .335 -.073(.014) .329(.006) .289 .352 -.063(.013) .010(.020)
Higher Edu .483(.007) .619 .416 .204(.015) .426(.007) .560 .348 .211(.014) .008(.021)
Non-white .030(.002) .024 .033 -.009(.005) .035(.002) .034 .037 -.003(.005) .006(.007)
Use Car .808(.005) .860 .780 .080(.011) .695(.006) .773 .647 .126(.011) .046(.016)
Years Vol
zero 59.90 - 100 55.44 - 100
one 21.72 50.32 - 22.28 44.41 -
two 8.57 22.28 - 9.21 21.78 -
three 3.92 10.65 - 5.37 13.13 -
four 2.38 6.63 - 3.10 7.80 -
five 1.84 5.29 - 2.40 6.10 -
six .90 2.62 - 1.14 3.00 -
seven .76 2.21 - 1.06 2.78 -
N 4,995 1,719 3,276 4,995 5,870 2,231 3,640 5,870 10866
NT 13,753 5816 7,937 13753 17,268 7,946 9,322 17268 31,021
Note: The figures are individual proportions (or averages) over time, averaged over the number of individuals. Robust
standard errors are in parentheses. N is the number of individuals and NT is the number of person-year observations. The
sample includes all male and female respondents aged 21-60 between the years 1996 and 2008. Volunteering data are available
every other year starting in 1996. Earnings and spousal income are in thousands of constant 1987 pounds sterling. Earnings of
the unemployed are included and set to zero.
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Table 3: OLS and Fixed Eﬀects Estimates of the Returns to Volunteer Experience
Men Women
OLS Fixed Eﬀects OLS Fixed Eﬀects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Volunteer 1.698 (.201) .394 (.159) 1.537 (.186) 1.372 (.167) .320 (.139) -.029 (.090) .646 (.125) .649 (.105)
Part-time 1.420 (.461) 1.445 (.503) -.3791 (.185) .136 (.182)
Full-time 3.980 (.608) 3.241 (.604) 1.374 (.306) .979 (.266)
Hours .020 (.014) .011 (.012) .117 (.009) .085 (.007)
Low Edu .718 (.234) .182 (.0996)
High School 1.159 (.179) .268 (.085)
Higher Edu 2.486 (.184) 1.271 (.106)
Non-white -1.129 (.548) -.391 (.214)
Year and
Region Eﬀects Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No No
Other
Regressors No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
R
2 .041 .437 .018 .328 .026 .625 .003 .553
NT 14,885 12,811 14,594 12,811 19,133 15,706 19,133 15,706
Note: The dependent variable is earnings measured in thousands of constant 1987 pounds. Earnings are zero for the
non-employed. The volunteering dummy is an indicator for having volunteered during the survey year or anytime in the past.
Standard errors in parentheses. In the OLS regressions, standard errors are robust, and in the fixed eﬀects regressions,
standard errors are clustered at the individual level. Other regressors include number of children, whether the individual is a
student, spousal income, dummies for age, marital status, age of children, belonging to a union, being a professional/manager,
working for non profit organization, firm size, and having use of a car
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Table 4: Rain by Region and Year
North Yorkshire East West
Year England and Humber Midlands England London England Wales Scotland
1996 2.338(.811) 1.850(.384) 1.688(.247) 1.319(.112) 1.366(.167) 1.953(.603) 3.229(1.559) 2.561(.663)
1998 2.958(1.300) 2.227(.544) 2.183(.346) 1.725(.130) 1.714(.170) 2.406(.596) 4.746(2.933) 3.232(.961)
2000 3.406(1.444) 2.380(.536) 2.353(.378) 2.001(.154) 2.191(.132) 2.653(.527) 4.808(1.734) 3.180(.892)
2002 3.052(1.194) 2.190(.514) 2.018(.385) 1.853(.138) 2.032(.188) 2.356(.470) 3.993(1.308) 2.918(.794)
2004 3.444(1.606) 2.188(.577) 1.911(.540) 1.641(.292) 1.637(.336) 1.970(.458) 4.253(1.560) 3.004(1.039)
2006 4.226(1.884) 2.955(.792) 2.259(.580) 1.680(.175) 1.721(.009) 2.288(.497) 4.631(1.142) 3.361(1.344)
2008 4.568(1.926) 3.541(1.082) 2.524(.487) 1.969(.213) 1.799(.248) 2.693(.699) 6.035(2.655) 3.657(1.341)
Pooled 3.335(1.605) 2.437(.831) 2.141(.499) 1.743(.284) 1.746(.348) 2.334(.624) 4.689(1.976) 3.159(1.072)
LADs 56 21 67 44 19 103 22 30
N 6,280 4,452 6,640 3,978 1,510 10,057 8,556 10,483
Note: The figures are three-year moving averages of mean daily rainfall (in millimeters) and the number of LADs in each
region. Standard deviations in parentheses.
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Table 5: Reduced-Form Estimates of the Eﬀect of Rain (Fixed Eﬀects)
Men Women
Volunteer Earnings Volunteer Earnings
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Rain .047 (.006) .224 (.067) .056 (.006) .181 (.043)
Part-time .040 (.035) 1.491 (.499) .074 (.020) .084 (.007)
Full-time .015 (.046) 3.275 (.600) .0515 (.028) 1.006 (.266)
Hours -.0002 (.001) .010 (.012) -.002 (.001) -.025 (.106)
Other
Regressors Yes Yes Yes Yes
F-stat 69.07 (.000) 11.24 (.001) 103.80 (.000) 17.70 (.000)
R2 .050 .073 .157 .315
NT 12,811 15,706 12,811 15,706
Note: The dependent variables are an indicator for having volunteered during the survey year or anytime in the past, and
earnings measured in thousands of constant 1987 pounds. Earnings are zero for the non-employed. Standard errors in
parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. Other regressors include number of children, whether the
individual is a student, spousal income, dummies for age, marital status, age of children, belonging to a union, being a
professional/manager, working for non profit organization, firm size, and having use of a car. The F-stat is for the test of
excluded instruments (p-values in parentheses).
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Table 6: IV Estimates of the Returns to Volunteer Experience
Men Women
(1) (2)
Volunteer 4.859 (1.498) 3.096 (.776)
Part-time 1.328 (.525) -0.0576 (.203)
Full-time 3.184 (.636) .836 (.280)
Hours .012 (.013) .089 (.008)
Other
Regressors Yes Yes
NT 11,462 14,265
Note: The dependent variable is earnings measured in thousands of constant 1987 pounds. Earnings are zero for the
non-employed. The volunteering dummy is an indicator for having volunteered during the survey year or anytime in the past,
instrumented by a three-year moving average of rainfall. Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the
individual level. Other regressors include number of children, whether the individual is a student, spousal income, dummies
for age, marital status, age of children, belonging to a union, being a professional/manager, working for non profit
organization, firm size, and having use of a car.
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Table 7: Alternative IV Estimates of the Returns to Volunteer Experience
Men Women
(1) (2)
Baseline 4.859 (1.498) 3.096 (.776)
LIML 4.859 (1.498) 3.096 (.776)
Annual Earnings > 0 5.503 (1.452) 4.106 (.850)
London Excluded 4.560 (1.412) 3.061 (.707)
Current Rainfall Instrument 6.010 (2.102) 3.704 (1.118)
NT 11,462 14,265
Temperature Instrument 9.236 (.939) 5.429 (.620)
NT 7,497 9,599
Note: Alternative estimates of the returns to volunteering. Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at
the individual level. The same covariates are included as in Table (6).
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Table 8: Placebo First Stage Regressions
Men Women
Rainfall Coeﬃcient Standard Error Rainfall Coeﬃcient Standard Error
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Hours Worked .039 (.079) -.093 (.090)
Work Full Time -.003 (.002) -.005 (.004)
Married .005 (.004) .006 (.005)
Spousal Income .033 (.053) .156 (.094)
Number of Children .000 (.007) -.006 (.011)
N 12,840 15,741
Note: First-stage regressions with alternative dependent variables. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level.
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Table 9: Gender Wage Gap Decompositions
IV Pooled
Endowments Coeﬃcients Coeﬃcients
Eﬀect Eﬀect %
(1) (2) (3)
Volunteer Experience -.208 .732 20.2%
Part-time Experience -.269 .302 8.4%
Full-time Experience 1.025 .916 25.3%
Total 1.007 2.618 72.2%
Mean Diﬀerential 3.624
Note: The endowments and coeﬃcients eﬀects are in thousands of constant 1987 pounds. Standard errors in parentheses. The
coeﬃcients % is the percentage contribution to the gender earnings gap due to the coeﬃcients eﬀect. The total sums all
components of the decomposition, including those not reported in the table. The IV estimates used to calculate the
decompositions are the same as those (partially) reported in Table (6).
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Table 10: Volunteer Organizations
Full Diﬀ
Sample Men Women (3)-(2)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Children/Education/Schools .279 .195 .347 .152
Youth/children activities .186 .170 .198 .027
Education for adults .139 .109 .163 .053
Sports/exercise .381 .438 .334 -.104
Religion .290 .271 .305 .034
Politics .030 .040 .021 -.019
The elderly .079 .064 .092 .027
Health, Disability and Social welfare .132 .099 .159 .060
Safety, First Aid .076 .075 .076 .002
The environment, animals .097 .092 .100 .008
Justice and Human Rights .049 .051 .048 -.003
Local community or neighbourhood groups .124 .122 .126 .004
Citizens Groups .032 .034 .031 -.003
Hobbies, Recreation/Arts/Social clubs .226 .250 .207 -.043
Trade union activity .074 .086 .065 -.021
Other/none of these .349 .351 .348 -.002
N 37,727 16,829 20,897
Note: Data from the UK Citizenship Survey. The question is, “Which of the following groups, clubs or organizations have you
been involved with during the last 12 months? That’s anything you’ve taken part in, supported, or that you’ve helped in any
way, either on your own or with others. Please exclude giving money and anything that was a requirement of your job.”
Individuals can choose more than one option.
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Table 11: Formal and Informal Volunteering Activities
Full Diﬀ
Sample Men Women (3)-(2)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Formal Volunteering
Raising or handling money/taking part in sponsored events .193 .178 .205 .027
Leading the group/member of a committee .092 .096 .089 -.007
Organising or helping to run an activity or event .178 .169 .186 .018
Visiting people/befriending/mentoring people .087 .080 .092 .012
Giving advice/information/counseling .127 .132 .123 -.009
Secretarial, admin or clerical work .056 .047 .063 .016
Providing transport/driving .082 .093 .072 -.021
Representing .049 .059 .042 -.017
Campaigning .034 .038 .032 -.006
Other practical help .130 .096 .157 .061
Any other help .041 .040 .041 .001
None of the above/No volunteering .613 .629 .599 -.030
N 58,058 26,156 31,900
Informal Volunteering
Keeping in touch with someone who has diﬃculty getting out and about .158 .139 .173 .035
Doing shopping, collecting pension or paying bills .143 .114 .167 .053
Cooking, cleaning, laundry, gardening or other routine household jobs .115 .098 .129 .031
Decorating, or doing any kind of home or car repairs .091 .147 .045 -.102
Baby sitting or caring for children .204 .114 .277 .164
Sitting with or providing personal care .033 .020 .043 .023
Looking after a property or a pet for someone who is away .196 .180 .209 .029
Giving advice .292 .305 .282 -.023
Writing letters or filling in forms .173 .163 .180 .017
Representing someone .057 .058 .057 -.001
Transporting or escorting someone .178 .184 .173 -.012
Anything .030 .036 .026 -.011
No help given in last 12 months .337 .350 .326 -.024
N 58,062 26,163 31,897
Formal vs. Informal Volunteering
Formal Volunteering .387 .371 .401 .030
Informal Volunteering .663 .650 .674 .024
N 58,062 26,163 31,897
Note: Data from the UK Citizenship Survey. The formal volunteering question is, “In the last 12 months, have you given
unpaid help to any groups, clubs or organisations in any of the following ways?” The informal volunteering question is, “In the
last 12 months have you done any of the following things, unpaid, for someone who was not a relative? This is any unpaid help
you, as an individual, may have given to other people, that is apart from any help given through a group, club or organisation.
This could be help for a friend, neighbour or someone else but not a relative.” Individuals can choose more than one option.
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Table 12: Volunteering Motivation and Satisfaction
Full Diﬀ
Sample Men Women (3)-(2)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Volunteering Motivation
I wanted to improve things/help people .592 .595 .589 -.006
I wanted to meet people/make friends .267 .258 .274 .016
The cause was really important to me .387 .378 .393 .015
My friends / family did it .202 .228 .182 -.045
It was connected with the needs of my family/friends .266 .228 .295 .067
I felt there was a need in my community .269 .285 .256 -.029
I thought it would give me a chance to learn new skills .180 .169 .189 .019
I thought it would give me a chance to use my existing skills .250 .266 .237 -.029
It helps me get on in my career .087 .074 .098 .023
It’s part of my religious belief to help people .182 .184 .181 -.002
It’s part of my philosophy of life to help people .224 .230 .220 -.009
It gave me a chance to get a recognised qualification .025 .020 .029 .010
I had spare time to do it .234 .234 .234 .000
I felt there was no one else to do it .089 .091 .087 -.003
None of these .040 .044 .037 -.008
N 7,269 3,211 4,058
Volunteering Satisfaction
I meet people and make friends through it .439 .416 .457 .041
I get satisfaction from seeing the results .623 .631 .617 -.014
It gives me a chance to do things I’m good at .255 .268 .245 -.023
It makes me feel less selfish as a person .219 .222 .217 -.005
I really enjoy it .559 .540 .574 .033
It broadens my experience of life .283 .280 .284 .004
It gives me a sense of personal achievement .303 .299 .306 .008
It gives me the chance to learn new skills .125 .110 .136 .027
It gives me a position in the community .070 .071 .070 .000
It gets me “out of myself” .094 .097 .093 -.004
It gives me the chance to get a recognised qualification .019 .017 .021 .003
It gives me more confidence .112 .098 .123 .026
It makes me feel needed .103 .081 .121 .041
It gives me the chance to improve my employment prospects .043 .035 .049 .014
It makes me feel less stressed .089 .099 .081 -.018
It improves my physical health .099 .130 .074 -.056
None of these .028 .031 .025 -.006
N 7,263 3,211 4,052
Note: Data from the UK Citizenship Survey. The motivation question is, “Thinking about all of the groups, clubs or
organisations you have helped over the last 12 months did you start helping them for any of the reasons on this card.” The
satisfaction question is, “Thinking about the things that you do for all of the groups, clubs or organisations you have helped in
the last year, would you tell me which of things on this card are most important to you.” Only those who volunteer formally
or informally respond. Individuals can choose more than one option.
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